From growth to green growth -- a framework by Hallegatte, Stephane et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5872


























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
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Green growth is about making growth processes resource-
efficient, cleaner and more resilient without necessarily 
slowing them. This paper aims at clarifying these concepts 
in an analytical framework and at proposing foundations 
for green growth. The green growth approach proposed 
here is based on (1) focusing on what needs to happen 
over the next 5–10 years before the world gets locked 
into patterns that would be prohibitively expensive 
and complex to modify and (2) reconciling the short 
and the long term, by offsetting short-term costs and 
maximizing synergies and economic co-benefits. This, 
in turn, increases the social and political acceptability 
of environmental policies. This framework identifies 
channels through which green policies can potentially 
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contribute to economic growth. However, only detailed 
country- and context-specific analyses for each of these 
channels could reach firm conclusion regarding their 
actual impact on growth. Finally, the paper discusses the 
policies that can be implemented to capture these co-
benefits and environmental benefits. Since green growth 
policies pursue a variety of goals, they are best served by 
a combination of instruments: price-based policies are 
important but are only one component in a policy tool-
box that can also include norms and regulation, public 
production and direct investment, information creation 
and dissemination, education and moral suasion, or 
industrial and innovation policies.1 
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Green growth is about making growth processes resource-efficient, cleaner and more resilient without 
necessarily slowing them.
1 This paper clarifies these concepts and proposes analytical foundations for 
green growth. The “green growth” concept developed here (1) focuses on what needs to happen over 
the next 5-10 years before the world gets locked into patterns that would be prohibitively expensive and 
complex to modify, and (2) seeks to reconcile the short- and the long-term, by offsetting short-term 
costs and maximizing synergies and economic co-benefits. Finally, the paper discusses the policies that 
can  be  implemented  to  capture  these  co-benefits  and  environmental  benefits.  Since  green  growth 
policies pursue a variety of goals, they are best served by a combination of instruments: price-based 
policies are important but are only one component in a policy tool-box that can also include norms and 
regulation, public production and direct investment, information creation and dissemination, education 
and moral suasion, or industrial and innovation policies. 
Green growth as an essential component of sustainable development  
 
The perception of the importance of growth as a driver for development has changed since the 1992 Rio 
convention endorsed the notion that, to be sustainable, development had to be balanced across its 
social, economic and environmental pillars.  
Growth—even measured with such an imperfect metric as GDP—is now recognized as a critical driver of 
poverty reduction and improvements in social indicators.  It has resulted in an 80% increase in GDP per 
capita in developing countries over the last twenty years despite continued increases in population.  
Living  standards  have  improved  for  many,  with  more  than  500  million  rising  out  of  poverty  and 
remarkable progress in literacy and education, life expectancy, infant, child and maternal mortality and 
malnutrition indicators.  And while much of the global poverty reduction has been driven by China, 
other countries that experienced growth also saw rapid poverty reduction.  Ghana for example grew 
much faster than the African average and managed to reduce its poverty rate from 51 to 30 percent 
between 1990 and 2005.  
It also turns out that growth does not cause income inequality—policies do (Milanovic 2011).  The 
famous Kuznets curve argument that posited that inequality would first increase and then decrease with 
income growth is not supported by the evidence.  Some countries reduce inequality as they grow; 
others let it increase.  Inequality increased substantially in recent decades in the United States and most 
of Europe while it declined in much of Latin America.   
The  implication  then  is  that  the  links  between  the  economic  and  social  pillars  of  sustainable 
development are generally positive.  Economic and social improvements tend to go hand in hand, and 
even more so in the presence of policies to reduce inequality. 
The story is not so simple when it comes to the economic and environmental pillars though there are 
some parallels.  In particular, just as with inequality, overall environmental performance doesn’t first get 
                                                           
1  This  expression  was  forged  in  the  context  of  the  WB's  forthcoming  environmental  strategy  which  calls  for 
development that is green [which here means resources-efficient], clean and resilient. 3 
 
worse and then improve with income—no Kuznets curve here. Of course, a number of local and visible 
environmental public goods do worsen at first and eventually improve with income—typically air and 
water quality.  But this is not true of local pollutants with invisible or long term impacts (e.g. pesticide 
accumulation), global pollutants (e.g. greenhouse gases) or the destruction of bio-diversity.  These get 
worse with higher income.   
So economic growth causes environmental degradation—or has for much of the last 250 years—and will 
continue to do so without activist policies.  However, many argue that the needed efforts would be too 
costly; that they would slow growth and destroy jobs; that poor countries can’t afford them.  
However, environmental degradation itself is costly: more than 3% in Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco 
during  the  various  years, 8% of  GDP  in  Iran  in  2002  (Croitoru  and  Sarraf, 2010).  Further, much of 
environmental destruction is driven by market failures and inefficient policies.  Correcting them can 
therefore result in a more efficient and productive economy, with increased output and prosperity.  It 
may be possible to have green growth without too much of a cost, and possibly with some significant 
benefits.  
Reconciling the three pillars of sustainable development does require policy efforts, particularly for the 
environmental one. Green growth policies are a critical part of such efforts and an essential part of 
implementing sustainable development.      
Defining green growth 
 
Green growth is about making growth processes resource-efficient, cleaner and more resilient without 
necessarily slowing them.   
Is  it  feasible?    Direct  contributions  of  environmental  protection  to  economic  growth  are  possible 
because the environment, which we can also think of as natural capital, is an input into the national 
production function, and environmental conservation can lead to increased inputs of natural capital and 
thus to an increase in income. The use of environmental assets is generally characterized by market 
failures – external costs and ill-defined property rights being common – and correcting these market 
failures  can  increase  the  effective  supply  of  natural  capital,  an  important  input  to  the  production 
function, hence increasing output; it can also increase human well-being directly by improving air and 
water  quality,  something  that  is  not  necessarily  captured  by  conventional  GDP  statistics  but  is 
nevertheless the ultimate goal of economic policy.  
Indirect contributions of environmental protection to economic growth are also possible because world 
economies are far from their “optimum.” Indeed, there are many market failures that are not directly 
due  to  environmental  issues,  but  that  have  negative  consequences  on  the  environment  and  the 
economy. Correcting these market failures thus has co-benefits that go beyond the environment. An 
obvious example is urban congestion which causes air pollution but also reduces the productivity and 
economies of scope typically offered by cities.  4 
 
These phenomena are not normally captured in analytical models of economic growth, partly because 
these do not generally model the role of natural capital in economic growth, and partly because they 
assume a first-best world. Moreover, the specification of the micro foundations of the growth process is 
at best weak in aggregative growth models. Since the potential for accelerated income growth thanks to 
green growth policies arises from market failures, they cannot be assessed using models unable to 
represent these market failures. Only models that represent unemployment and imperfection in the 
labor market can for instance investigate the gains from green policies in terms of jobs and employment.    
This paper aims at clarifying these concepts in an analytical framework and at proposing foundations for 
green growth, starting from and building on the long tradition of adapting growth theory to include the 
environment (e.g., Nordhaus, 1972; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974).  
The next section examines the analytical case for green growth, putting it in the context of existing 
growth paradigms. We then discuss the link with welfare—which is what we care about rather than 
growth per se.  Section 4 explains the flaws in the “grow now, clean up later” argument and presents the 
analytical  case  for  urgency.    Section  5  reviews  policy  instruments  to  push  our  economies  towards 
greener growth path, arguing that a narrow reliance on prices will not solve problems characterized by 
multiple market failures and behavioral challenges and that green strategies must rely on a broad policy 
mix.  
The last section concludes with key findings:  
  There  is  a  strong  analytical  case  for  green  growth,  and  one  can  identify  channels  that  are 
theoretically able to make green policies contribute to economic growth; however, detailed and 
country- and context-specific analyses of each of these channels are required to conclude that 
this will in fact happen in any specific situation.  
  Looking  at  economic  development  and  environmental  protection  in  a  common  framework 
enables us to identify substantial synergies between them. 
  Social and political acceptability of green growth policies requires maximizing and highlighting 
benefits and co-benefits, including potential positive impacts on poverty alleviation and job 
creation, as well as managing unavoidable trade-offs. 
  Green growth policies need to focus on what needs to happen over the next 5-10 years before 
the  world  gets  locked  into  settlement  and  production  patterns  that  would  be  prohibitively 
expensive and complex to modify.   
Is it really possible to green growth? The analytical basis 
 
Classical growth theory (Solow, 1954) assumes that output Y is produced using technology and human 
capital A, physical capital K, and labor L. The relationship often reads: 
Y = f (A, K, L), 
with dY/dA > 0 ; dY/dK > 0 ; and dY/dL >0. 5 
 
Output growth dY/dt is explained by growth in production factors K and L, and growth in productivity A. 
Growth in labor L is explained by population growth, labor force participation and improvements in 
health and education.  
Growth in K is explained by investment, and growth models assume that a share of output is used to 
increase the stock of capital K: 
Y = C + I , 
dK/dt = I –  K , 
where    represent  the  obsolescence  and  depreciation  of  capital.  Growth  in  A  is  explained  by 
technological  change,  including  changes  in  organization  and  practices,  and  by  social  capital 
improvement (better institutions, social cohesion, etc.).  
In some growth theory models (e.g., the Solow model of 1956), labor and total productivity growth is 
exogenous. In others models (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990 and 1994; Mankiw et al., 
1992; Aghion and Howitt, 1998), productivity growth is endogenous and depends on investments in 
education,  research  and  development,  on  the  scale  of  output  and  on  learning  by  doing.  Economic 
policies can influence accumulation of physical capital, social capital, and human capital to maximize 
output or to maximize the growth in output (i.e. GDP growth).  
In this approach, the environment has no productive role, although it can enter through the utility 
function through its amenity value.   
Environment enters as a factor in the production function 
The idea that economic production is directly dependent on the stock of natural resources and on 
environmental quality-- i.e. that the environment is an argument of the production function -- has been 
around at least since Malthus (Malthus, 1798) and further developed in a well-developed environmental 
economics literature that took off in the early 1970s (Nordhaus, 1972; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 
1974).
 2 
 This modification of classical growth theory focuses on the constraints created by exhaustible resources 
and views the environment mostly as a limiting factor—either because of its finite ability to produce 
resources or its finite ability to absorb waste (for a survey, see Brock and Taylor, 2005).  The tone can be 
more positive—with healthier soils and greater water quantity, agriculture is more productive; with 
improved air and water quality, the population is healthier and more productive; with better land use 
management, natural disasters can be averted and death and destruction avoided etc—but the basic 
idea is the same.  
Whatever  the  emphasis,  this  approach  stresses  the  services  provided  by  ecosystems,  beyond  the 
amenity functions they play (and which enter into the utility function).  The environment becomes 
                                                           
2  Later efforts to explicitly model the environment into an endogenous growth framework include Smulders (1994) 
and Bovenberg and Smulders (1996); for a review, see Smulders (1999).  6 
 
“natural capital”, directly needed for growth. And environmental management becomes a productive 
investment, directly comparable to investment in physical capital. A failure to manage the environment 
results in the depreciation and destruction of natural capital, with direct impacts on output.  
We thus have: 
Y = f ( A, K, L, E) 
With dY/dE > 0 
A  key  question  in  this  framework  is  the  extent  to  which  production  factors  are  complements  or 
substitutes: if substitutes, destruction of the environment can be compensated by investing more in 
physical or human capital or in technical change;   if complements (or weak substitute), then protecting 
the environment is necessary to maintain economic production.  
There are few studies of the potential for substituting other inputs for natural capital, though it is 
generally accepted that it has limits. Soil and water are necessary for food production even if technology 
and increased labor intensity can reduce the quantities needed. Low elasticity of substitution between 
natural capital and other inputs implies a small increase in the former can free large quantities of the 
latter. To be precise, if we think of two inputs to production, natural capital E and other inputs O 
(including labor and physical capital), then if natural capital is scarce and the elasticity of substitution is 
close to zero, the ratio of the marginal product of natural capital to that of other inputs is very high and 
a small rise in E substitutes for a large quantity of O. Formally if the production function is a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function with: 
        
   
            
   
  
 
   
 
Then, the relationship between the marginal product of E and that of O is 
           









This marginal product goes to infinity as the ratio of O to E increases and the elasticity goes to zero, so 
that  if  environmental  capital  is  scarce  and  other  inputs  abundant,  the  marginal  value  of  extra 
environmental capital can be very large.
3  
Dasgupta and Heal (1979, p. 196) make a distinction between exhaustible resources that are essential or 
inessential: a resource is inessential if it is possible to produce positive consumption for ever without it, 
and it is essential if consumption must eventually decline to zero. Whether a resource is essential or 
                                                           
3 Sometimes, it is useful to  distinguish between short-term and long-term substitution. It may be possible to 
substitute a loss of natural capital with other capitals under the short-term, but not over the long-term. For 
instance, using more fertilizers can compensate for soil degradation over the short-term, but is not a long-term 
solution. 7 
 
inessential depends on the elasticity of substitution between the resources and other inputs. If this is 
low enough it is essential.  
One extreme case is the risk of catastrophe. An environmental catastrophe may mean that all economic 
production becomes impossible: 
Lim Y(A, K, L, E) = 0 
E → E* 
In  the  absence  of  market  failures—i.e.  if  all  environmental  externalities  were  internalized—
environmental assets would have a price and a “Green GDP” could be calculated by introducing the 
environment into national accounts.
4   Unfortunately, environmental externalities, market failures and 
technical and ethical issues in calculating the “price” of environmental assets, complicate the calculation 
of this Green GDP.  
One question is whether investing in the environment increases only the level of production, or also its 
growth. The answer is likely to be context specific. As explained by Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), an 
increase  in  production  level  increases  income  and  savings,  and  thus  accelerates  growth  where 
production growth is limited by credit constraints (i.e. desirable and profitable investment opportunities 
exist but cannot be realized due to a lack of savings and inadequate access to capital markets).  Not so 
where output growth is limited by investment opportunities (because institutions are not in place to 
allow investors to benefit from their investment revenues): where people are engaged in low-return 
activities an increase in production level will not translate into an increase in economic growth because 
economic activity does not generate sufficient returns to allow households to save and accumulate 
assets.   
Green policies as a source of growth  
 
Up to now, the positive impact of environmental policies on economic output has operated through an 
improvement in environmental conditions: better forestry management reduces soil erosion leading to 
more productive agriculture.  Environmental policies are not specifically included in the production 
function—only their impact on E; and their only impact is, in fact, on the environment.  However, 
environmental policies may themselves have externalities and impact growth through channels other 
than an improvement in the quantity or quality of environmental inputs.  
A broader framework, closer to reality, accounts for the fact that in practice real-world economies are 
far from their optimal, or first-best state due to market failure and other sub-optimalities such as: 
  Knowledge spill-overs and economies of scale that lead to under-investments in research 
and development (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992);  
                                                           
4 For a review of the literature on the integration of the environment in national accounts, see Heal and Kriström 
(2005). See also an application of these ideas in World Bank (2006). 8 
 
  Under-utilization of production factors (physical capital or labor through unemployment) for 
temporary (crisis) or structural reasons;  
  Behavioral biases maintaining the economy away from its optimal equilibrium (e.g., inability 
to  make  decisions  concerning  low-probability  events,  Magat  et  al.,  1987;  Camerer  and 
Kunreuther, 1989; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995; Tversky and Shafir 1992).  
Policies can contribute to growth if they help correct these sub-optimalities.  As such, green growth 
policies can be defined as policies that address sub-optimalities, hence contribute to growth, while at 
the same time protecting the environment.  Most are environmental policies in the sense that their 
primary objective is the preservation of the environment —but not all (e.g. energy security policies; 
policies to reduce urban congestion…)  
To  represent  the  role of  green  policies,  our  growth  model  needs  to  be  designed  in  a  second-best 
framework, in which there are market failures and the economy is not at its optimal equilibrium. To do 
so, we introduce two changes in the production function. First, we assume that f is not the current 
production function, but the production frontier, i.e. the maximum possible production level possible 
with the available technology, physical capital, labor, and environment, assuming maximum efficiency. 
Actual production is given by: 
Y =   f(A,K,L,E), 
Here   measures the efficiency of the production process, and lies between 0 and 1. Over the short 
term,   can also include demand-led and Keynesian effects, when actual production is more constrained 
by demand than by production capacity (i.e., in situation of high unemployment and low utilization of 
production capital).  
Second, we introduce PE, which can be thought of as the effort dedicated to environmental policies, in 
the production function: 
Y =   (PE) f (A(PE), K(PE), L(PE), E(PE))        (1) 
The costs (or disutility) associated with environmental efforts create a trade-off between environmental 
protection and economic production.  They may: 
  Reduce productivity (A), by causing producers to use more expensive or less productive 
technologies (e.g. renewable energy sources that are more costly than coal).  
 
  Result in the early retirement of physical capital (K) if the capital is based on polluting 
technologies (Grubb et al. 1995, Jaccard and River 2007).  This effect can be represented 
as a decrease in K or an increase in capital depreciation. In addition to the direct cost, 
the increase in investment needed to replace retired capital reduces consumption, thus 
welfare, at least over the short term. 
 
  Increase the price of some goods and services, and alter relative prices. Doing so, they 
change the structure of demand, making the structure of production less able to serve 9 
 
it. Demand may decrease in some sectors that have a high production capacity (e.g., 
tourism  in  distant  places)  and  increase  in  other  sectors  that  have  a  more  limited 
production  capacity  (e.g.,  public  transportation).  This  effect  can  be  measured  as  a 
reduction in efficiency, i.e. a reduction in  . 
These costs—and their assessment—are dependent on the definition of economic output Y. In a green 
accounting framework, a reduction in economic productivity due to environmental regulations can be 
more than compensated by a reduction in external effects which leads for example to the preservation 
of ecosystem services. If Y (and A) includes ecosystem services, then the total impact of the regulation 
can be an increase in Y (and A).  
Environmental policies can also increase conventionally measured economic output (GDP) if they: 
i.  Increase the effective quantity of production inputs K, L, and E. The impact of environmental 
policies on E is obvious since improving E is their main objective. But environmental policies 
can  also  increase L,  for  instance  because  better water  and  air  quality  improves  worker 
health condition (Hanna, 2011). They can also increase K, because well-managed natural 
risks lead to lower capital losses from natural disasters (Hallegatte et al., 2007). 
 
ii.  Produce  productivity  gains  by  correcting  the  many  market  failures  affecting  the 
environmental sphere and enhancing efficiency of resource use (i.e., increasing  ), thereby 
reducing production costs and increasing productivity and competitiveness, or playing a 
stimulus role. Gillingham et al. (2009) shows how green policies targeting energy efficiency 
can achieve their objectives at negative cost. Zenghelis (2011) proposes the use of green 
policies as a stimulus in countries in recession.  
 
iii.  Shift the production frontier by accelerating innovation development and dissemination, 
and  creating  knowledge  spillover  in  the  entire  economy,  thereby  increase  A.
5  Since 
investments  in knowledge tends to be lower than desirable in the absence of public 
intervention, policies targeting green technologies can usefully increase R&D investments 
(Gerlagh, 2006; Otto et al., 2008; Fischer and Newell, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2011).
6  
These three positive factors are shown in Figure 2.  
   
                                                           
5  This  argument  on  the  impact  of  green  policies  on  productivity  is  the  macro-scale  equivalent  of  the  Porter 
Hypothsis  (Porter  and  van  de  Linde,  1995),  who  states  that  regulation  can  enhance  innovation  and  business 
performance at the micro-scale (see a review in Ambec et al., 2011). 
6 A frequently asked question is whether green innovation needs public support specifically targeted towards 
green innovation or more generally towards innovation.  Here we actually ask the opposite question can green 
innovation policies accelerate innovation in general?  
 10 
 
Figure 2: The effect of green policies on output. The arrow (i) represents the increase in production 
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We can represent these positive effects analytically by differentiating the production function totally 
with respect to environmental policy, giving as the impact of a change in environmental policy: 
  
   
                                                       (2) 
where a prime denotes the derivative of a function of one variable,    is the marginal product of the 
capital X (for K, L and E) or of productivity (for A).  
Thus,         is the direct benefit from the environmental policy, while             ,        and        are 
the different co-benefits. This formula identifies five channels through which environmental policy 
affects output: its impacts on 
  Capital stock        ) 
  Labor force (      ) 
  Natural capital (       
  Efficiency and demand-led effects     ) 
  Technology and intellectual capital (      ) 
An example of the efficiency link (   ) is offered by energy efficiency. There is evidence that many cost-
effective investments – that reduce energy consumption at a negative cost – are not implemented by 
households in the residential sector. There are competing explanations for these inefficiencies, but they 
are likely linked to market failures and behavioral biases (Gillingham et al., 2009; Box 7). Environmental 
policies aiming at reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions may correct these market failures 
or influence these behaviors, leading to less environmental damages and to a more efficient economy, 
with a higher growth potential.  
There are many other examples of inefficiencies that can be corrected with both environmental and 
economic benefits. Having functioning land markets with secure land tenure would help provide services 
to informal settlers (including solid waste removal, sanitation and drainage, drinking water). Beyond 
environmental  benefits  (e.g.,  in  terms  of  water  pollution),  this  would  increase  welfare  and  labor 
productivity, and the overall functioning of the economy (for instance because land tenure increases 
access to credit for poor households and makes it possible for them to invest in small businesses).    
Since     also  includes  demand-led  effects,  the  channel       also  includes  stimulus  effects.  An 
environmental policy can have macroeconomic benefit through a stimulus effect during an economic 
recession, when capacity utilization and employment is low, and when the policy is demand-increasing, 
for instance because it implies large investments in green infrastructure (Zenghelis, 2011).  
The link through technology and intellectual capital        ) is illustrated in Box 1, with investment in 
R&D on photovoltaic power motivated by a desire to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and reduce 
climate change. Success could make photovoltaics competitive with fossil fuels and increase the supply 12 
 
of  electric  power,  and  indeed  reduce  the  cost  of  providing  electric  power  to  remote  off-grid 
communities.  Theoretically,  however,  the  opposite  effect  is  also  possible,  as  research  on  “green” 
technologies could crowd out research focused on productivity-increasing technologies (Popp et al., 
2009). 
Box 1. Solar Panels – Distributed Power Generation 
Solar energy may soon replicate one of the most remarkable success stories of the last few decades, the growth of 
mobile  phone  use  in  developing  countries.  For  countries  with  no  land-lines,  cellular  phones  have  a  great 
advantage. They require less capital investment and can be deployed faster. The extraordinary growth of mobile 
communications has provided a platform on which many other services are now carried, including mobile banking, 
access  to  market  data  and  to  medical  advice.  Today  the  conditions  are  ripe  for  a  repeat  of  this  distributed 
deployment  of  infrastructure,  but  in  the  field  of  power  generation  rather  than  communication.  In  that  case, 
technological  developments  that  have  been  promoted  for  environmental  reasons  may  lead  to  technological 
change that increases the overall productivity of the economy (even if output is defined in a narrow sense). In this 
example, the impact of environmental policy on economic growth is captured by the term        of Equation (2).  
Solar power has many of the characteristics that allowed mobile phones to be deployed so fast. The cost has fallen 
dramatically in the past five years, from $8 per watt of capacity to about $1.70, leading to a levelized cost of 
electricity in the US of about 10-12 cents per kilowatt hour. [Power from wind or gas costs about 5-6 cents, from 
coal about 6-8 cents, per kilowatt hour. The retail price of power is around 15 cents.] There are little economics of 
scale to the deployment of solar power, and so little economic penalties to small-scale use, and in general it is 
deployed at the demand site *“off grid”+, obviating the need for power grids.  
Solar power is therefore ideally suited to southern developing countries with high levels of solar radiation and no 
power infrastructure in place in rural areas: the total cost of deploying solar power in rural areas is less than that of 
conventional power stations plus a grid *which in the US costs about $3 million per mile+. Solar’s drawback is that is 
ceases when the sun sets, and so needs to be accompanied by batteries that can store power into the night.  
Solar power is already available in some rural developing countries. In the Iquitos region of Peru, along the upper 
reaches of the Amazon, the provincial government and NGOs have combined to make solar panels, batteries and 
compact fluorescent bulbs available to households at less than the cost of fuel for the generators they were 
previously  using  for  power.  Electricity  is  now  available  at  zero  marginal  cost,  encouraging  use,  and  with  no 
environmental impact. In Bangladesh ex employee of the Grameen Bank runs Bright Green Energy, which sells 
solar panels and batteries, provides financing in conjunction with the IFC and local banks, and in conjunction with 
Grameen Technology Center trains women to install and service solar power sources.  
The labor force link (        can work through the effect of environment on health. Better environmental 
policies  can  reduce  atmospheric  pollution  in  cities,  reduce  respiratory  diseases,  and  increase  labor 
effectiveness and reduce days lost due to illness. Graff Zivin and Neidell (2011) provide an example of 
this link between air pollution (in that case, ozone) and labor productivity in farms in California. Using a 
database of daily worker output, they find a surprisingly strong impact, with a 10 ppb decrease in 
ozone concentrations increasing worker productivity by 4.2 percent. 
As an illustration of how environmental policies may increase capital and its productivity         , one 
only has to think of mitigating climate change and the way in which this will prevent economic impacts 13 
 
(including, e.g., increased disaster losses in some regions, and possible declines in the productivity of 
agriculture  and  the  capital  equipment  associated  with  it),  or  of  improved  water  management  that 
increase  the  productivity  of  water-using  activities.  Another  example  is  linked  to  natural  disasters: 
protecting mangroves can improve resilience of coastal zones to hurricanes and storm surges, thus 
reducing capital losses due to coastal floods. 
As  an  illustration  of  the  natural  capital  link  (       ,  consider  fisheries,  where  the  introduction  of 
individual transferable quotas help to maintain the resource, and thus the economic activity that is 
dependent on it (Box 2).  
Box 2: Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) 
We noted in the main text that environmental policies could affect the supply of natural capital, this effect being 
captured by the term         in Equation (2). ITQs provide a good illustration of this point: they are a policy that 
corrects an environmental problem, lack of property rights leading to overfishing, and there is clear evidence that 
they lead to an increase in the output of and employment in the fishing industry.  
ITQs operate by setting a cap on the total allowable catch (referred to as TAC). This is set at a level that is 
consistent with the long-term survival of the species. So the general rule used here has been to try and set a cap 
that is less than the rate of growth of the fish stock. To make the process of setting a cap clearer, let’s suppose we 
have a fish stock of 10,000 tons and that this grows by about 10% or 1,000 tons per year. Then the TAC should be 
set at or below 1,000 tons: this way we remove 1,000 tons every year but the population grows by this amount 
and the total remains constant: we have a rule that is compatible with the long-run survival of the species. The 
increment to the population is sometimes referred to as the maximum sustainable yield: it’s the largest catch that 
will sustain the population.  
In practice matters are a bit more complicated: humans are not the only species that catch fish. Sea birds and 
marine mammals – sea lions, sea otters, seals – also eat fish, as do a wide range of large predatory fish such as 
tuna and swordfish. If the ocean is to remain productive and healthy we have to allow all these other species to 
eat their fill too. So we need to come below the maximum sustainable yield.  
Once a TAC is set, this is divided into individual quotas, amounts that can be caught by particular boats or skippers. 
Only quota owners can fish, and they cannot catch more than their quota. Continuing our earlier example, we 
might allocated ten percent of the TAC to each of ten boats, allowing each in this case to catch 100 tons each year: 
if each abides by its catch quota then the total is within the TAC. So an individual quota is a fraction of the TAC to 
which a boat or skipper is entitled. If the TAC changes from year to year then the number of tons represented by 
the quota also changes, though the fraction of the TAC does not.  
These quotas are transferable, that is they can be sold (or given or left in a will) to others. The really central point 
here is that their value depends on the productivity of a fishery: 1% of a thriving and productive fishery with large 
fish stocks is worth far more than 1% of an almost-extinct fishery. So quota-owners – fishermen – now have an 
investment in the long-run health of their fishery. The quotas are generally a major part of their wealth and if they 
overexploit the fishery then they impoverish themselves. They do now have an incentive to leave fish in the water 
to breed and generate future catch, something that they otherwise lack. ITQs align the interests of fishermen and 
the fishery, and generally raise both the health of the fishery and the profits of those who fish it. An approach 
related to ITQs is that of “catch shares:” each boat or owner is entitled to a share of the TAC, but these are not 14 
 
transferable. So they aren’t liquid assets like ITQs, but do have many of the same effects as ITQs: they are assets 
whose value depends on the health of the fishery.   
The results of implementing systems of ITQs have been dramatic. A recent study looked at the histories of over 
11,000 fisheries, of which 121 had instituted ITQs at the time of the study.
7 Most of the ITQs were on the New 
Zealand coastal shelf, the Icelandic coastal shelf and in the Gulf of Alaska, some of the world’s most productive 
fisheries. The data shows a dramatic increase in catch within a few years of the implementation of an ITQ, and a 
great decease in the chance of a fishery collapsing once it is managed as an ITQ. On average, within seventeen 
years of implementing an ITQ (seventeen was the number of years of data available at the time of the study), the 
catch on fisheries with ITQS rose by a factor of five, that is, by four hundred percent. In some cases yields were up 
by as much as a factor of two hundred. So the fisheries prospered and generated a better living for those who 
worked in them, and of course more food for the rest of us. This is immensely encouraging: we do know how to 
manage fisheries, and the fact that so many are still grossly overexploited reflects a lack of political will rather than 
an insuperable economic problem in the management of common property resources.  
Catch shares or ITQs have now been implemented in many US coastal fisheries, an encouraging sign. In addition, 
many of these fisheries have very recently (as of 2010 on the west coast and 2011 on the east) begun to tackle the 
problem of by-catch by issuing “multi-species catch shares,” shares that allow the owner to catch and sell a range 
of different species of fish. The point here is that, as noted when we talked about by-catch, a tuna boat will 
inevitably catch fish other than tuna, and if licensed only to land tuna will discard fish of great economic value. 
Allowing it to keep and sell some other species will be a big step toward reducing the waste of by-catch. (Heal and 
Schlenker, Nature 2008). 
 
What about welfare? 
 
A distinction needs to be made between environmental impacts that affect welfare through their impact 
on income and consumption and those that do so through the amenity value of environmental assets.  
Poor urban households who struggle to feed and house themselves will place a lower priority on the 
amenities provided by an urban park than rich households might. However, they care deeply about the 
absence of solid waste management and its results—dengue epidemics, clogged urban drains that lead 
to floods and the destruction of their homes and small business equipments. In rural areas, protecting 
forests for the purpose of preserving rare animals may not a priority for households who struggle to 
feed themselves (unless of course the poor can share in the benefits from wildlife protection). But the 
same households care about protecting soil quality and managing water flows, which allow them to 
grow crops. The former environmental goods affect utility only. The latter affect income and production 
capacity and cannot be considered as superior goods. 
   
                                                           
7 Reference to Costello et al. (2008) and Heal and Schlenker (2008). 15 
 
Ultimately we care about welfare, not output, so the next step is to take into account the impact of 
output on welfare (or utility, U). Since investment does not increase welfare directly, we can assume 
that utility depends only on the current level of consumption C: 
U = u (C), 
with du/dC >0. 
One policy goal then should be to maximize U




∞ = ∫ e
-t U(C(t)) 
Here   is the pure rate of time preference. In the Ramsey-Cass-Koopman model, investment I(t) is such 
that the discounted sum of utility is maximized. If the production function and the utility function 
respect certain conditions, and if labor L and productivity A grow a constant rates, then the economy 
converges toward a balanced growth pathway, the rate of which is entirely determined by labor and 
productivity growth rate.  
Starting from this very basic growth theory, one can introduce environmental management in the 
picture. E becomes a measure of environmental quality that is endogenous to the model and is affected 
by current and cumulative production. Typically E would be a decreasing function of both Y and its 
integral, reflecting the idea that production generates both a stock and a flow of environmental damage. 
The framework can also be augmented to account for the fact that environmental protection can also be 
justified on amenity grounds. This means assuming the environment needs to be preserved because 
people derive utility from it directly—watching a sunset, visiting a protected area, etc. In that case, we 
have: 
U = u (C, E), 
with du/dE >0. 
The risk of an environmental catastrophe can be represented by U going to infinitely negative values 
when environmental quality is too degraded: 
Lim U(C,E) = – ∞ 
E → E* 
 
                                                           
8 In fact, the definition of U
∞ includes all questions related to inter-temporal distribution, and different 
approaches co-exist, from the discounted-utility presented here (with debates about the right discount 
rate for environmental issues), to Rawlsian criterion. 16 
 
We then want to maximize U
∞ which now directly depends on E: 
Max ∫ e
-t U(C,E) 
But utility does not only depend on the average, aggregated level of consumption, and on the 
environment. In practice, it is possible that environmental policies affect utility directly (e.g., by creating 
jobs), with effects that are not mediated by aggregated consumption and the state of the environment:  
U = u (C, E, PE) 
We still want to maximize U
∞, but in that case we take into account possible effects of environmental 
policies. As for growth, environmental policies PE can have negative or positive impacts on utility. For 
instance, distribution (how total consumption is distributed across individuals) and volatility (how total 
consumption is distributed over time) also matter for welfare.
 Everything else being equal, many favor 
stable consumption patterns and lower consumption inequality.
9 Introducing these additional factors in 
the utility function leads to two additional impacts of environmental policies on welfare. 
Regarding distribution, environmental policies–for instance higher energy prices because the 
environmental externality is internalized– have income and distributive effects (Box 3).  They may lead 
to job destruction for example in polluting industries. But – under conditions heatedly debated in the 
scientific community – environmental policies may also lead to net job creations in countries where 
unemployment is a serious problem and help alleviate poverty. Also, women are found to be more 
dependent on common property resources and more vulnerable to the negative externalities of natural 
resource degradation (Foa, 2009). Environment protection and green policies can thus contribute to 
improved gender equality, with many economic and social co-benefits. 
This creates both social and political economy issues and may require the implementation of 
complementary policies that aim at compensating losers (see Box 3). If lump-sum transfers are possible 
at zero cost and labor markets are perfect, efficiency can be separated from equity. If lump-sum 
transfers are impossible or costly and if labor markets are imperfect, then a combined investigation of 
efficiency and equity becomes necessary 
Box 3: Distributional impact of climate policies, and possible complementary measures: lessons from energy 
subsidy removal and modeling exercises. 
There are strong distributional impacts of climate policies within countries, but there are also complementary 
policies that can be implemented to compensate their possible negative impacts.  
In first-best contexts, it is possible to separate efficiency and equity issues in policies (Harberger, 1978), because it 
is possible to make zero-cost lump-sum transfers. Indeed, if such transfers are possible, then ex post transfers can 
cancel any undesirable distributional impact. Such transfers meet however many difficulties: political acceptability 
(Kambur, 2010), information and technical issues (Sen, 1973, 1976; Bourguignon and Fields, 1990), behavioral 
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changes  can  make  such  transfers  impossible.  In  absence  of  such  transfers,  the  distribution  effects  of  climate 
policies need to be taken into account in the design of the policy. 
The experience from removal of fossil fuel subsidies illustrates well the possibilities and limits of ex post correction 
of negative income impacts.  Typically the largest share of fossil fuel subsidies goes to the better-off (the poor 
consume much less energy, seldom own cars and may not even have access to electricity) so that a removal of the 
subsidies has a positive distributional impact.  However, the subsidies is also often a significant share of the poor’s 
income so that a removal can have a very negative welfare impact on the poor and the near poor  (Coady et al., 
2006; Freund and Wallich, 1995; Hope and Singh, 1995).  As such complementary policies are critical to not only 
increase political acceptability but ensure the poor are not subject to unacceptable price shocks.  These policies 
include the use of existing safety nets, alternative short-term mitigation measures and subsidies, and energy-
pricing solutions. It is useful to make a difference between middle- or high-income countries where social safety 
nets  exist  and  can  be  used  for  compensation  and  low-income  countries,  where  ad  hoc  measures  are  often 
necessary. Also, information to target support is often not available in these countries, especially in urban area 
where geographic targeting is very inefficient (Kanbur, 2010).  
Carbon pricing would have significant re-distributive impacts, among income- or wealth-classes, between rural and 
urban  households,  across  regions  and  countries,  and  between  consumers,  workers,  and  shareholders.  Three 
modeling exercises illustrate these effects. First, carbon pricing would have large redistributive impact across rural 
and urban households in Indonesia, which could require specific measures targeting poor rural households (Yusuf 
and Resosudarmo, 2007). Second, carbon pricing has inter-regional and income-class redistribution (Rausch et al., 
2009; Hourcade et al., 2010), but these impacts could easily be compensated with changes in other taxes (e.g., 
labor  tax  or  capital  tax).  Third,  carbon  pricing  can  have  an  impact  on  spatial  inequalities  within  a  city,  with 
households dependent on individual transportation being affected more strongly; in that case, most of these 
negative impacts can be avoided by introducing carbon pricing slowly enough, to allow land and housing prices to 
adjust (Gusdorf et al., 2008).  
The consistent findings from studies on this issue are that: (i) the redistributive impacts of a carbon price scheme 
depend essentially on how revenues from the scheme are used; (ii) complementary measures are available to 
compensate for unintended distributional effects; (iii) these complementary measures meet the classical 
challenges of redistributive policies, mainly linked to political acceptability, imperfect information and targeting, 
and behavioral issues; (iv) a rapid and aggressive action is more likely to create negative distributional impacts 
than a slower and more predictable action. 
The second factor is linked to the fact that environmental policies can influence output volatility. They 
can do so negatively, by creating a shock on the economy and by distorting inter-temporal trade-offs. 
They can do so positively by reducing potential risks to growth by increasing resilience to environmental 
shocks (such as natural disaster) or economic shocks (such as oil shocks, spikes in commodity prices, or 
loss of competitiveness due to innovation in another country). As a consequence, they can stabilize 
output and consumption, increasing welfare if risk aversion is accounted for.
10  
This factor can be represented by introducing the notion that future growth is subject to numerous 
uncertainties that need to be managed. This uncertainty includes but is not restricted to uncertainty 
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on its structure and pattern. A green growth strategy will aim at making development risk-decreasing, thereby 
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about the environment (e.g., climate change amplitude and patterns, risks from biodiversity losses, 
natural disasters); other major uncertainties include demographic changes, technological innovations, 
evolutions in preferences, and even policy performance. Taking into account these uncertainties, the 
production function and the utility function become partly stochastic, and the previous equations refer 
to their expected values: 
Y = (PE) f (A (PE),K(PE), L(PE), E(PE), ) 
U = u (C, E, PE,  
where  and are random variables, and <0 and <0  correspond to bad outcomes and df/d>0 and 
du/d>0. Note that these random variables not only include long-term environmental uncertainty (e.g. 
climate sensitivity), but also other shocks that negatively affect welfare or the economy (oil shocks, 
commodity price volatility, natural disasters, technological accident, etc.).  
Box 4: Energy efficiency and oil shocks 
In the 1970’s oil shocks have caused important macroeconomic fluctuations, but recent events suggest that the 
vulnerability of the world economy to oil shocks has decreased (Nordhaus, 2007). Several explanations can be put 
forward  to  explain  the  diminishing  impact  of  oil  shocks  on  economic  growth.  Blanchard  and  Gali  (2008)  and 
Gregorio et al (2007) identify the following factors: (a) the average oil-intensity of world GDP has decreased since 
the first two oil shocks, thus reducing vulnerability to oil prices; (b) labor markets – wages in particular – have 
become more flexible, so that oil shocks pass-through inflation is more difficult for a given monetary policy ; (c) the 
nature of oil shocks has changed, since the 73 and 79 shocks were caused by supply disruption while the 2008 
shock was caused by increasing demand in emerging markets ; (d) the low and stable inflation rate of these last 
decade have improved the agents’ confidence in monetary policy and has stabilized inflation expectations. 
Among these explanations, an obvious and important one is the decrease of GDP oil-intensity, which was driven by 
specific  energy  security  policies.  In  some  countries,  higher  taxes  on  gasoline  consumption  have  reduced  oil 
consumption; in others, other instruments like norms and regulations have reduced energy consumption by cars, 
industries, and in the residential sector. In all cases, these effects can be modeled as a decrease in df/di.e. in 
the dependency of output (or GDP) to one random variable, here the price of oil.  
Over the longer term, Rozenberg et al (2010) suggest that climate policies may have similar results: by driving 
technological  change  and  investment  away  from  oil-intensive  patterns,  they  reduce  oil  consumption  and 
vulnerability to oil shocks. Thus, climate policies can reduce the world vulnerability to oil scarcity and to the 
uncertainty in oil reserves. In particular, it might reduce the need for capital renewal in case of large change in 
energy prices, i.e. reduce the obsolescence of capital, which is represented by the term        in Equation (2). 
Climate policies can then produce co-benefit of climate policies in terms of energy security and resilience. 
In the same way, Gusdorf and Hallegatte (2007) show that cities that are developed with higher transportation 
taxes – and thus are denser and less energy consuming – are less vulnerable to volatility in future transportation 
prices. In Gusdorf et al. (2008), it is also shown that a rapid change in transportation price can also have strong 
spatial and distributive impacts, with suburbs affected more strongly than urban centers (i.e., an impact through 
du/d because of distributive effects, in additional to the impact on aggregated consumption).  19 
 
A green growth agenda can help reduce the vulnerability of U to  and by reducing df/d and 
du/d. Box 4 provides an example of how environmental policies targeting higher energy efficiency can 
reduce the economic vulnerability to oil shocks (both in terms of aggregate output and consumption, 
and in terms of distribution). In that case, the main benefit is environmental, but the resilience of the 
economy to other exogenous shocks (e.g., geopolitical tensions) is reinforced. 
Taking into account this uncertainty, it is then possible to maximize the expected utility, E[U
∞]: 
Max E*∫ e
-t U(C,E)] , 
Expected utility maximization is often considered to give low influence to worst-case (low-probability, 
large impacts) scenarios, whereas more risk averse decision-makers may prefer a maximin approach 
(that aims to maximize the utility that can be obtained in the worst possible situation).  
Trade-offs and Synergies 
The previous sections have shown that environmental policies can have costs, in terms of reduced 
output,  consumption  or  welfare,  as  well  as  welfare  or  income  benefits.  The  net  impact  will  vary 
depending on the particular policy considered and the context.
11  
The balance between costs and benefits  will also depend on how costs and benefits are defined . In a 
narrow economic framework, a policy to protect a mangrove  forest will have an economic cost (for 
instance  by preventing shrimp farming or  tourism  development), and no direct benefit.  But in a 
framework that includes the valuation of ecosystem services, the policy will also have economic benefits 
from the valuation of the  services the  mangroves offer: protection against coastal storms, breeding 
ground for fisheries, wood resources for local community. As such, green accounting that include the 
valuation of ecosystem services offer a much better measure of  trade-offs and are central to green 
growth strategies (Box 5).   
Measuring the net impacts of green growth  policies also critically requires capturing existing sub -
optimalities due to market or government failures or to non-rational behaviors.  Models based on first-
based assumptions (perfect markets, rational expectations, etc.) can usefully assess benchmark costs of 
these policies (i.e., what would they cost in a perfect world), but are unable to investigate the potential 
for co-benefits.  
Box 5: Green accounting 
With both production and utility defined as functions of the environment, it is useful to define measures of 
economic progress which encompass both produced and natural factors – to define ‘green’ national accounts. A 
large literature has dealt with both theory and practice on greening the national accounts (Aronsson and K-G 
Löfgren, 2010; Heal and Kriström, 2005; for a recent application see World Bank, 2011). 
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To do so, there is a need to estimate shadow prices for environmental goods, including the values of in situ natural 
resources and the damages to production and welfare associated with the depletion and degradation of the 
environment. For commercial natural resources the shadow prices are readily estimated, and robust methods exist 
for valuing certain pollution damages, such as the damage to health associated exposure to air pollution.
12 But for 
important natural assets, such as biodiversity, arriving at sound shadow prices is more problematic. In addition, 
ecological services are largely capitalized in existing asset values (pollination service values are capitalized in the 
value of farmland, for example), but not explicitly – for policy purposes it will therefore be useful to break out 
ecological service flows in extended national accounting systems.
13 
Key green accounting indicators include adjusted measures of net saving and net income. Savings measures 
adjusted for the depletion and degradation of the environment provide a measure of sustainability: if net saving is 
negative then social welfare – the present value of utility – is falling (Hamilton and Clemens 1999, and Dasgupta 
and Mäler 2000). Net income can then be measured as consumption, plus the direct contribution of the 
environment to wellbeing (with price         ), plus net saving (Asheim and Weitzman 2001).
14 
Source: Kirk Hamilton 
Why not grow now and clean up later? 
Some  dimensions  of  environmental  quality  improve  with  average  income  (e.g.,  air  quality,  water 
quality),  while  others  do  not  (see  the  long  debate  on  the  environmental  Kuznets  curve).
  15  In  this 
framework, one explanation for income-related environmental improvement is that the environment is 
a superior good:
16 when C is low, the utility U does not depend much on E. This would imply that poor 
people care less about the environment, give priori ty to economic consumption C over environmental 
quality E, and act upon these preferences .  At higher levels of consumption, with basic needs having 
being met, people will put a higher weight on the environment, leading to investments in environment 
protection and clean-up that will increase environmental quality, assuming the appropriate collective 
action proves possible: 
   
    
         
This  idea  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  environmental  issues  will  “solve  themselves”  with  economic 
development. In this framework, little effort is needed on environmental protection in poor countries, at 
                                                           
12 For resource depletion, the United Nations (2003) is developing guidelines for green accounting. A recent paper 
by Muller et al. (2011) estimates the total value of pollution damages in a national accounting framework. 
13  See  the  WAVES  partnership;  http://go.worldbank.org/89A3W2FTU0.  A  good  reference  on  environmental 
valuation is Freeman et al. (2003). 
14 The link between net saving and social welfare is only certain to hold if the accounting is complete, however, 
covering all assets which contribute to production or welfare. 
15 The empirical literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) was triggered by Grossman and Krueger 
(1993, 1995). Early empirical contributions also include Selden and Song (1994), and Shafik & Bandyopadhyay 
(1994); for a review, see Barbier (1997). Many subsequent work has aimed at deriving an EKC analytically, see, e.g. 
Stokey (1998); Andreoni and Levinson (2001);  Brock and Taylor (2010).  
16 Another common interpretation is that the environmental Kuznets curve reflects structural transformation of an 
economy.  As economies transform from largely agrarian to more industrial, environmental quality deteriorates.  
But as economies shift from largely industrial to more service-sector oriented, environmental quality improves. 21 
 
least for local public goods like water and air quality, and the focus needs to remain on economic 
production.  
The “pollute now and clean up later” argument suffers from a number of weaknesses. Indeed, there are 
several situations in which early action may be desirable. 
First, it may be more economical to start reducing or preventing pollution at an early growth stage 
rather than incurring all the cleanup costs at later stages, even when discounting is taken into account. 
This question is related to the role of technology and infrastructure lock-in, and is particularly important 
in developing countries where most of the infrastructure will be built in the next decades. 
Second, it ignores the role of environmental irreversibility. When reversal is not possible, investments in 
environmental quality protection are necessary over the short term. This is the case for example in 
Kenya, where traditional forests are destroyed for bio-energy or agriculture.  It is possible to restore 
their “water tower” and other functions through replanting but not their bio-diversity and tourism 
industry potential. 
Third, the influence of environmental quality and welfare is often indirect, so people may not link water 
or  soil  quality  to  the  health  issues  they  are  confronted  with.
17  Alternatively, populations may not 
internalize the public health benefits of a healthier environment. With better information on these 
indirect effects, they may ask for higher environmental quality at earlier stages of development.  Public 
intervention may be needed to internalize the externality. 
Fourth, even when they care (and evidence abounds that they do, given that they tend to be very 
vulnerable to environmental harm), poor communities may not have the “voice” to make their concerns 
heard. Implemented policies in developing countries may be more representative of the preferences of 
elites than those of the poor or reflect institutional constraints such as those imposed by poorly defined 
property rights (as in open access resources). More generally, it is difficult to infer preferences about 
collective goods from individual behavior. If cities offer many more jobs and opportunities than rural 
areas, but also much higher levels of local pollution, the fact that people move from rural areas to cities 
does not mean they would not prefer slightly less opportunities and higher environmental quality in 
cities. Their preferences are not completely revealed by the binary choice “moving or not to the city”, 
because  they  do  not  have  a  continuum  of  choices  of  increasing  opportunities  and  decreasing 
environmental quality. More generally, this example shows the limits of inferring individual preferences 
from observed behaviors, justifying the use of other tools such as surveys. 
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that the hump-shaped environmental Kuznets curve applies to local 
pollution with short-term and visible impacts, but rarely to natural resource depletion (water resources) 
which have a long-term component or to global pollutants such as greenhouse gases (which combine a 
long-term component with a global scale). It seems likely that local environmental issues with short 
term manifestations get solved spontaneously as countries develop (e.g., local air and water pollution), 
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while global public goods with long-term consequences can keep getting worse (e.g. climate change and 
carbon emission, biodiversity).  
The analytical case for urgency 
Minimizing costs and enhancing benefits may require early action, for two main reasons. 
First, delaying action can be costly. In the climate change debate, the optimal timing of action is a 
research topic that has emerged from an evaluation of arguments in favor of postponing emission 
reduction  (Nordhaus  1992,  Wigley  et  al  1996).  Those  arguments  include  the  risk  of  prematurely-
depreciated investments if climate change turns out to be less threatening than expected, and the role 
of discounting. But other analyses suggest that early action is cheaper. For instance, Lecocq et al (1998) 
find that in absence of perfect foresight, specific early policies directed toward green infrastructure and 
long-lived capital are necessary to achieve mitigation objectives at a lower cost. Jaccard and Rivers 
(2007)  also  find  that  early  action  is  preferable  in  long-lived  capital  sectors,  like  infrastructure  and 
urbanization, even if marginal costs are higher there. Gusdorf and Hallegatte (2007) and Gusdorf et al. 
(2008) find that changing urban forms to make them less energy consuming is extremely costly (Box 4). 
Developing  countries,  therefore,  would  do  well  not  to  let  their  cities  grow  in  a  low-density,  high-
individual car-use patterns if their ultimate target for the end of this century is to have high-density and 
energy-efficient cities.  
One measure of  the  importance of  early  action  is  provided  by  Davis et  al. (2010), who assess  the 
warming commitment due to existing energy infrastructure (i.e. the global warming that cannot be 
avoided without early scrapping of existing energy infrastructure). They find that this commitment is 
about  1.3°C.  Introducing  infrastructure  driving  transport  demand  and  non-CO2  gases,  Guivarch  and 
Hallegatte (2011) find that this commitment reaches 1.7°C. These results show that maintaining climate 
change below a 2°C warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures, require that almost no new 
infrastructure is designed disregarding climate change and suggest that urgent action in needed in long-
lived infrastructure. In absence of such action, delayed environmental policies will have to force the 
early replacement of physical capital (i.e., a decrease in K or an increase in capital depreciation), which is 
one of the main component of environmental policy cost and affect output through the channel        
(as mentioned earlier). 
Others arguments for early action are based on technical change, reaching contrasted results (Goulder 
and Mathai, 2000; Manne and Richels, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006). On the one hand, delayed action will be 
able to use better and cheaper technologies, and may be less expensive than early action. On the other 
hand,  these  better  technologies  will  be  developed  only  if  serious  commitments  toward  emissions 
reduction are made, and some technologies are now in the stage where learning-by-doing, economies of 
scale, and supported deployment is the best way of increasing productivity and reducing costs. In these 
cases, early action is justified by the technological changes that would be induced by this action (i.e., by 
the channel       ).  23 
 
There are also cases in which early action is necessary to avoid irreversible environmental changes.
18 
This is the case of some ecosystems that  cannot be recreated when they have been destroyed, or of 
species that cannot be saved once they have disappeared. It is indeed very likely that most biodiversity 
losses are irreversible, suggesting the need for immediate action in this domain  (Chapin et al., 2000). 
This is also the case with climate change, since reachable  objectives are less and less ambitious over 
time, in absence of stricter global climate policies . For instance, the 2°C objective is achievable only if 
significant emission reductions can be made before 2030 (e.g., Meinshausen et al., 2009; O’Neill et al., 
2009).  This  irreversibility  is  a  clear  incentive  for  early  action,  since  the  consequences  of  warming 
exceeding 2°C are highly uncertain (see Ha-Duong et al., 1997, Ambrosi et al., 2003; World Bank, 2009). 
Green Growth is about what needs to be done in the short to medium term. As a consequence, the 
identification of the actions that are needed (or much cheaper) if implemented early is a key component 
of the development of any green growth strategy. 
Short term costs vs long term gains: tackling the political economy of GG 
When the benefits of environmental policies occur mainly over the long term or are global and diffuse 
rather than immediate and local, implementation is more difficult. The policy debate tends to focus on 
temporal trade-offs between short-term costs and long-term benefits. 
Greening growth requires tackling the political and social acceptability of action.  As such a green growth 
policy must seek to mitigate the temporal trade-offs in environmental policy design through shorter-
term economic co-benefits highlighted earlier.    
How to make it happen: policy instruments to green growth 
 
Green growth policies can be divided into three broad categories:  the “getting the price right” policies; 
the “complement or replace prices” policies where markets signals can’t be relied upon to effect the 
desired changes; and “activist” policies such as innovation or industrial policies.   
Getting the price right  
Environmental issues are often linked to “externalities”, i.e. to the fact that the actors whose decisions 
impact the environment do not see the full impact of their choices and are not charged for the damages 
they cause. As a consequence, aligning prices with social values by “getting the price right” or “pricing 
the  externality”  is often  considered  as the  main  economic  solution  to these  issues  (Baumol, 1972; 
Baumol and Oates, 1971, 1988).  Many instruments exist to do so, from taxes and subsidies (taxing the 
damages and/or subsidizing a reduction in damages) to tradable emission permit and the creation of 
property right markets. Box 1 provides an example in which setting a cap on the total allowable catch 
and creating a market (and thus a price) on fractions of this cap has been effective in making fisheries 
more sustainable.  
                                                           
18 There is a debate about what « irreversible” means. Strictly speaking, over geological timescales, almost nothing 
is completely irreversible. Here, we label as “irreversible” the impacts that cannot be reversed over less than a few 
centuries.  24 
 
Getting the price right can also open doors for co-benefits in terms of economic growth and social 
welfare.  Often  environmental  taxation  (taxing  "bads")  and  removing  distortionary  subsidies  creates 
additional fiscal space to permit reduced taxation or subsidization of green public “goods” such public 
transport, renewable energy or green R&D (see also the literature on the double dividend: e.g. Goulder, 
1995;  Parry  and  Bento,  2000).  Thus  in  addition  to  generating  some  reduction  in  traffic,  London’s 
congestion tax has generated substantial resources to finance new investments in London’s aging public 
transport system—thereby increasing the effectiveness of the price signal by reducing the costs or “dis-
utility” associated with switching from single-car use to public transport.  
Additional taxation or reduced subsidization can also have strong negative distributional impacts, and 
increase poverty. But the resources that can be drawn from them allow for compensating this effect 
(Box 3).   
Introducing the right policy mix 
Getting the price right is important, and should be the first step, but – in a second-best framework – 
such  a  measure  may  be  insufficient  or  inapplicable,  requiring  complementary  measures.  (These 
complementary measures may in addition fix market failures and result in higher income and economic 
growth.)  
First,  it  is  often  difficult  to  change  prices  to  more  appropriate  values,  including  all  externalities 
involved. Price changes face strong opposition and may prove to be impossible for political economic 
and social acceptability reasons. As shown in Box 3, however, much can be done to enhance the political 
acceptability  of  measures,  for  instance  by  compensating  or  mitigating  inappropriate  distributional 
effects. Using existing safety nets or implementing specific measures to compensate the adversely-
affected population can make it possible to increase prices up to a value that represents real social 
costs.  In  this  case,  the  right  approach  is  a  policy  mix  including  a  change  in  price  and  a  set  of 
complementary measures to ensure the political and social acceptability of the new price. 
Second, it is difficult to assess the correct prices, including all externalities. Bolt et al. (2005), Hanley 
and Barbier (2009), Pagiola et al. (2009) provide reviews of the various methodologies to infer the 
economic  value of  environmental  goods  and  services  that  are  not  traded  in  actual  markets.  These 
methods have pros and cons, and are more or less appropriate depending on the context. However, 
they always involve significant uncertainties. In particular, it may be difficult to reach a consensus as to 
what the right prices is, considering the large ethical components of these prices when non-market 
values  are  included.  Disagreement  on  valuation  can  make  price  changes  difficult  to  implement  in 
practice, and may require the use of alternative, non-price, policies. 
Third, it has been observed that introducing taxation or prices can have negative consequences on 
behaviors. Indeed, behaviors are driven by economic calculation, but also by social values and intrinsic 
motivations.  In  some  cases,  the  introduction  of  payment  has  been  shown  to  reduce or  cancel  the 
motivation linked to social values and to have the opposite impact on behaviors that was anticipated. 
This effect has been identified, e.g., by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who show that it is irreversible (i.e., 25 
 
the role of social values cannot be restored by removing the payment). As a consequence, they claim 
that to change behaviors, one should “pay enough, or not pay at all”.   
Fourth, and most important, many market imperfections exist that can prevent prices from being the 
silver-bullet of environmental policies.  These include:  
  Low price elasticity. The ability of prices to trigger changes in behaviors and technological 
changes is sometimes limited by substitution possibilities: the responsiveness of drivers to 
higher  fuel  prices  is  low  in  the  absence of  alternative means of  transport  (Box  6).  The 
responsiveness of renewable energy to feed-in tariffs will depend on whether transmission 
lines are built between centers of consumption and the location of renewable resources. In 
these cases, price-based policies may have to be complemented with direct investments in 
infrastructure  (e.g.,  public  transportation,  transmission  lines),  and  with  additional  policy 
actions,  like  changes  in  urban  planning  or  in  norms  and  regulations.  Moreover,  if 
substitution capacity is limited by alternatives, then the provision of these alternatives may 
increase the efficiency of the economy and increase income or promote economic growth.  
They may also make the increase in price more politically acceptable.     
Box 6: Complementarities between price and non-price instrument in urban transport 
Hoornweg et al. (2011) explain why price-based instruments alone may be inefficient, especially over the short-
term: “in the short run, energy pricing may not work, especially once consumers have made their purchases of 
equipment or vehicles. Short-term elasticities for energy demand are actually relatively low […] because consumers 
are not influenced by price signals once they have locked in vehicle purchases and housing type and location, and 
often, location of employment. Long-run elasticities are more difficult to estimate and may underestimate the 
savings  potential  that  result  in  changes  in  infrastructure  systems,  because  of  locked-in  and  long-lived  capital 
investments.  
Energy efficient cities, such as Hong Kong and Tokyo, have deliberately regulated individual car use and urban 
sprawl  early  on  in  their  development.  Without  these  efforts  any  reductions  in  energy  consumption  for 
transportation and household use resulting from price incentives would likely have been superseded by high income 
inelasticities for individual car use and high household energy consumption. Standard policy measures are not likely 
to lead to strong responses in greening cities, because elasticities for energy intensive activities, such as personal 
car ownership and housing location and type, are low. Infrastructure policies, which favor energy intensive housing 
or transport, have in fact reduced the responsiveness of citizens to fiscal and regulatory policies.” 
  Inertia  in  behavior  is  such  that  many  energy  efficiency  measures  that  might  pay  for 
themselves  are  not  implemented.  For  instance,  households  do  not  always  react  to  an 
increase in energy price by improving building energy efficiency (see for instance, Train, 
1985; Gillingham et al., 2009; Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). Measures based on labels, 
information, and fiscal incentives may help influence behaviors. For instance, Abrahamse et 
al.  (2007)  presents  the  result  from  a  study  in  which  an  internet-based  tool  is  used  to 
encourage households to save on their direct (gas, electricity and fuel consumption) and 
indirect  (through  transportation  and  goods  consumption)  energy  consumption.  The  tool 
combines feedback on past consumption, energy saving tips, and goal setting. It is shown 
that this information helps households to reduce their direct energy consumption, and in 
the study households with access to the tool reduces their direct energy consumption by 5 26 
 
percent, while household with no access to the tool increase their consumption by 0.7 
percent.  
 
  Missing markets or institutions. Specific institutional measures can be required to transform 
the “right price” into the right incentive.  Thus principal-agent issues can prevent tenants 
from  improving  their  home  energy  efficiency  (Box  7).  These  are  also  examples  where 
correcting the environmental externality also correct an economic externality and increase 
efficiency.  
 
Box 7. Institutional schemes to distribute energy efficiency investments across tenants and owners. 
There  is  a  large  potential  of  cost-effective  energy  savings  in  the  residential  sector,  and  thus  a  potential  for 
increasing the efficiency of the economy, represented by the term     in Equation (2). 
In Germany, tenants represent 51% of households, which is the highest share in Europe. Moreover, two third of 
rented apartments are owned by households, social housing being only a minor part of the housing market (7%). It 
is thus crucial to implement policies and measures to incentivize owners to improve energy efficiency in rented 
apartment. Rents are bounded by a reference rent at the beginning of the lease, and their increase during the 
lease are bounded by the “comparable regional rent”, established in €/m2, for each city and as a function of the 
apartment characteristics. The law however authorizes rent increase during a lease, in case of investments that 
“increase quality of life” or “reduce water or energy consumption”. In this case, the rent can reach 120% of the 
comparable regional rent. The rent increase is calculated on the basis of the “transferable” costs, equal to total 
investment costs reduced by what is considered a maintenance cost and by the financial support provided to 
owners. The rent increase is bounded at 11% per year of the transferable costs, which means that – for the owner 
– the investment is paid off in at most 10 years.  
In  France,  the  ADEME  (Agence  De  l’Environnement  et  de  la  Maîtrise  de  l’Energie)  provides  examples  energy 
efficiency investments that have been shared between owners and tenants in a win-win manner. The private 
residence “Les Castors”, in Bron, is composed of 4 buildings and 32 dwellings. The owner invested 430 k€ in energy 
efficiency in the building, i.e. 200€/m2 or 13 k€ per apartment. The investment has been financed for 25% by 
subsidies  and  for  25%  by  an  increase  in  rent  by  an  average  of  15€/months/apartment.  For  the  owner,  the 
operation  paid  for  itself  in  10  years  thanks  to  increased  rents.  For  tenants,  the  increase  in  rent  by  15 
€/m2/apartment has been more than compensated by a 35€/month/apartment reduction in energy expenditure. 
To generalize this type of investment, the ADEME proposes a distribution rule for energy efficiency investment in 
building. Such a rule has to be (i) secure, i.e. it has to make sure that the overall housing cost does not increase for 
the tenant and that the owner can recoup its investment; (ii) transparent, i.e. includes only investment in energy 
efficiency and not normal maintenance costs; (iii) balanced, i.e. the cost transferred to tenants should not exceed 
owner investments; (iv) simple, i.e. easy to calculate to avoid costly legal conflicts between owners and tenants. 
The ADEME proposed rule is to have an annual transferred cost equal to 75% of the annual investment cost for the 
owner, in the limit of 75% of energy savings made by the tenant. The annual investment cost is equal to the 
annualized total investment costs reduced by the amount of financial support and the amount corresponding to 
normal maintenance expenditures. 
Source: ADEME, Réhabilitation du parc locatif privé, Stratégie & Etudes n°18, February 2009.  
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  Finally,  price  instruments  may  be  difficult  to  put  into  practice,  for  technical  or 
institutional-capacity reasons. For instance, market-based instruments like quotas have met 
technical problems in their implementation, even in regions with high capacity.  This is the 
case  of  the  European  Trading  System  (Betz  and  Sato,  2006).  In  some  case,  alternative 
approaches may reveal simpler to implement and enforce, like norms, regulation, or other 
institutional innovation. Box 8 provides an example of an institutional innovation to deal 
with a classic tragedy of the commons problem, in the oil industry sector. However, the 
practical difficulties in implementing these alternative measures should not be disregarded. 
It is likely that different solutions are preferable in different countries with varying degree of 
institutional  capacity,  transparency,  accountability  and  capacity  of  civil  society).  The 
implication  is  that  green  growth  strategies  will  need  to  be  tailored  to  a  country’s 
circumstances, and that “best practices” should be imported with caution. 
 
Box 8: Hot Oil and unitization 
The importance for overall economic performance of correcting environmental problems can be seen in the case 
of oil. In this case the term        in equation (2) above captures the impact of environmental policy on the 
effective supply of natural capital and hence on the value of output.  Oil provides also an example in which a 
solution has been identified that does not rely on prices or quotas, but on institutional innovation.  
Under certain conditions oil becomes a common property resource. An oil field is a pool of oil beneath the earth. 
The shape of an oil field belowground does not always match the shape of the exploration and production licenses 
bought  by  oil  companies,  and  several  companies  may  buy  the  right  to  explore  and  produce  the  same  field. 
Imagine, as a concrete example, an oil field that is ten miles square, 500 feet below ground, and contains twenty 
million barrels (roughly one day’s consumption for the US). Oil company geologists know there is oil in this area, 
but don’t know how much or the exact shape of the oilfield. Two oil companies buy exploration and production 
rights over this  field,  Company L buying a ten by five mile concession covering the left half of the field and 
company R buying the same shape covering the right half of the field. So we have two drilling concessions sitting 
on top of one pool of oil. Once they start producing oil, both companies are extracting from the same pool of oil: 
there are twenty million barrels there and the more company L extracts the less remains for company R. So the oil 
is now a common property resource: one firm’s “catch” comes entirely at the expense of the other’s, an extreme 
case of a common property resource. The natural outcome, once the companies recognize that they are drawing 
from the same pool, is that they will rush to remove the oil from this as fast as possible. After all, the competitor 
will probably take any oil left behind.  
This is in fact exactly how things happened in many US oil fields in the first third of the twentieth century, leading 
to serious consequences. Companies produced oil faster than they could sell it, and stored it aboveground, in 
storage  tanks.  Oil  above  ground  is  dangerous:  it  is  inflammable,  and  can  cause  explosions,  which  is  what 
happened. And storing oil is expensive, so companies had an incentive to sell it as fast as they were producing it, 
and this led to gluts of oil and sharp drops in its price, bad for long-term investment in oil sources. An additional 
drawback of this type of competition between firms to extract oil from the field, is that rapid extraction can 
damage the structure of the field and reduce the total amount of oil that can ultimately be removed: the faster 
you pull the oil out, the less you get, within limits. Oil produced in these competitive situations, and in excess of 
what the market could absorb, was known as “hot oil.”   
We just referred to a simple hypothetical example of two firms buying the right to explore and produce in one 
field. In fact matters got far worse than this: in the 1920 over 1,000 (one thousand!) firms had the right to explore 28 
 
and produce from the East Texas oil field, a single pool of oil, and between them they drilled 10,000 wells in their 
attempts to extract oil before their competitors. Most were small companies that have long since vanished or been 
absorbed into the oil majors: one had a fascinating name, the ITIO Company, Indian Territory Illuminating Oil 
Company, redolent of the days when oil was used in lamps and not cars. In the East Texas field competitive 
extraction lowered the pressure of the oil and gas in the field so fast that it was clearly damaging the prospects for 
recovering a reasonable fraction of the total, so the Governor of Texas stepped in and closed the field, using 
provisions of martial law, on two occasions, in August 1931 and December 1932. The East Texas field was an 
outlier in terms of the number of companies developing it and the degree of overexploitation, but it was not 
uncommon to find a dozen or more companies drilling into the same oil pool. To give another example, the 
Hendrick field in West Texas was developed by eighteen firms, who drilled on average one well per ten acres, 
whereas one well per eighty acres would have drained the field rapidly.  
For all these reasons, regulators sought ways of solving the problem, and in many cases adopted the solution of 
unitization. Unitization means that the companies owning different parts of an oil field all agree to operate it as 
one single company, rather than as many competing entities. In our example, companies L and R would set up a 
new company which owns the entire oil field, say the LR Oil Field Company, with each having 50% of the shares in 
this (shareholdings are generally prorated to the amounts of the field owned). LR would then operate the field as a 
single company, following an extraction policy that makes long-run economic sense.  
Unitization has worked in the US: a study compared the productivity of twenty oil fields in Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma  and  Texas,  ten  of  which  were  developed  before  unitization  and  ten  after.  After  fifteen  years  of 
production, output from the earlier group has declined to just 8.6 percent of peak output, whereas that of the 
later group was still at 73.9 percent of peak. Before unitization could be legally required, it was possible for all the 
firms drilling into a field to get together and agree on a common development policy: this tended to happen when 
there were only a few companies involved in a field, but not when there were many, as for example in the East 
Texas field. The problems of reaching a policing an agreement were insuperable with such huge numbers.  
In sum, it is useful to distinguish two cases. When prices can be adjusted to reflect social costs, then 
additional complementary policies are often necessary to support substitution, influence behaviors, and 
translate the price into the right incentive, or to correct some undesirable effects of the price change 
(e.g.,  the  distributional  impact).  When  prices  cannot  be  adjusted  for  technical  or  political  reasons, 
alternative policies can replace them, but specific care should be devoted to the risks from rebound 
effect: with inappropriate prices, implementing norms to increase energy efficiency can reduce energy 
bills and incentivize less responsible behaviors. In that case, a combination of norms and “behavior-
based” policies might be more efficient than norms only. 
Activist policies: innovation and industrial policies 
 
Knowledge externalities and learning effects are critical to how we deal with environmental protection, 
and justify complementing price-based instruments with R&D support (Gerlagh, 2006; Otto et al., 2008; 
Fischer and Newell, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2011). 
Economies of scale, concentration externalities, coordination failures, information asymmetry, capital 
market imperfections, and technological lock-in effects are such that price incentives would need to be 
uneconomically high to stimulate the needed investments. Also, current prices may be ineffective to 
stimulate investments with long term pay-offs, justifying the use of multiple instruments, especially 
targeting long-lived capital (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2011). Indeed, sector-scale policies can help 
develop technologies or change practices without having to set a very high price for the externality. Box 29 
 
9  summarizes  Japan’s  experience  to  promote  energy  efficiency,  using  a  mix  of  objective  setting, 
benchmarking, norm and regulations, R&D, and direct investments.  
These types of industrial policies may usefully complement price-based policies, even though there are 
risks associated with them. In particular, the role of government failures (see discussions in the climate 
domain in Anthoff and Hahn, 2010 and Helm, 2010) needs to be accounted for in the same way than 
market failures are included. Activist policies create a risk from capture and rent-seeking behaviors 
(Laffont,  1999)  that  need  to  be  considered.  For  a  comprehensive  survey  of  industrial  policies  in 
developing countries, see Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010).    
 
Box 9. Japan’s energy efficiency strategy: an example of sector-scale policy 
Building on its excellent track record in energy conservation since the first oil shock (the energy use per unit of GDP 
has decreased 26 percent between 1980 and 2009), Japan has pledged to go further with the “Energy Conservation 
Law” enforced in 2006. The law seeks to improve energy efficiency (already one of the highest in the world) by 30 
percent in 2030 relative to 2006. The aim is double: protecting the environment, and improve the efficiency of the 
economy (represented by the term      in Equation (2)). 
To reach such a target, the plan outlines a strategy to foster energy conservation technologies and develop and 
disseminate a benchmarking approach in order to correctly monitor energy conservation. More precisely, the 
strategy seeks to (i) introduce the most advanced technologies for replacing equipment in the energy sector, (ii) 
make  net-zero-energy  houses  available  by  2020  (and  the  norm  nationwide  by  2030),  and  (iii)  introduce  new 
integrated standards for energy consumption in all buildings.  
Interestingly, the national strategy also contains the Top Runner Program, which is a very innovative policy to raise 
energy efficiency standards. The program sets standards for 21 products (e.g. vending machines, air conditioners, 
television  sets,  etc.)  sold  in  Japan.  On  a  regular  basis,  officials  test  all  the  products  available  in  a  category, 
determine  the  most  efficient  model,  and  make  that  model’s  level  of  efficiency  the  new  baseline.  Then, 
manufacturers have the obligation to make efforts to achieve the new baseline within four to eight years. If a 
manufacturer does not meet the target or fails to make a good faith effort, this fact is publicized. Conversely, 
products which have reached the energy efficiency standard receive a “Top Runner” label.  
Furthermore,  the  newest  innovation  in  energy  efficiency  is  the  concept  of  “smart  community”.  A  smart 
community is a model city which maximizes the use of renewable energy (such as PVs, wind power and micro 
hydraulic) and heavily relies on smart grids to deal with its intermittent nature. Four large-scale pilot projects were 
started in Japan in 2010. For instance, in Fukuoka, the deployment of energy conservation systems for an entire 
town will involve a real-time energy management for 70 companies and 200 households using smart meters. In 
Kansai  Science  City,  an  active  deployment  of  electric  vehicles  will  be  undertaken,  with  the  construction  of  a 
network of charging station. The Japan Smart Community Alliance brings together private companies from the 
power, automobile, and IT sectors, as well as the construction industry, the public sector, and academia. Japan is 
also seeking to export this concept: a project is under way in India and a “smart community plan” has been signed 
between Japan and China.  
Source: METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) website  http://www.meti.go.jp/ and World 




Green policies are adopted to deliver environmental benefits—such as public health in China or 
combating desertification in Niger—which should increase welfare. The first category of benefits from 
green policies is thus the economic benefits from a better environment, including the amenities derived 
from it and the use of natural capital as a production factor. 
Most of these policies are also likely to have an economic cost over the short term, such as higher 
investment or operational costs. These costs create trade-offs between environmental protection and 
economic growth. But environmental policies can also sometimes yield economic benefits and 
contribute to growth, by correcting existing sub-optimalities and market failures. The “green growth” 
idea is to reconcile the short and the long term, and to offset short-term costs by maximizing synergies 
and economic benefits (e.g., job creation and poverty alleviation, increased efficiency) and by mitigating 
trade-offs across both space and time. Doing so, it tries to make environmental policies easier to 
implement in spite of political obstacles, and to increase the social and political acceptability of 
environmental policies. 
Of course, green growth cannot be disconnected from the welfare measurement issue. Even when 
environmental policies increase welfare (or even wealth) over the short term, they may lead to a 
decrease in GDP, for instance because of a change in investment structure or higher reliance on (non-
measured) ecosystem services. Wealth and green accounting are thus essential tools to help design 
green growth policies (see Box 5). But they are not a requirement for implementing environmental 
policies. 
In absence of a comprehensive, consensual, and operational wealth accounting, our Green Growth 
approach is to screen green policies through the following check-list, to investigate whether it is possible 
to design policies differently to obtain – in addition of environmental benefits – short term benefits in 
one of the five following categories: 
  Increase  in  production  factors,  especially  natural  capital,  and  human  and  social  capital, 
through improvements in health, education, cohesion, and stability.  
 
  Shifting the production frontier (i.e. being able to produce more with less) and making the 
economy  cleaner,  through  correcting  market  failures  in  innovation  development  and 
dissemination and improving knowledge spillovers in the entire economy.  
 
  Making the economic more  efficient, i.e. correcting market failures to get closer to the 
production  frontier  with  existing  technologies,  and  thus  reduce  production  costs  and 
increase  competitiveness  (including  stimulus  during  periods  of  under-utilization  of 
resources).  
 
  Increasing  resilience  to  environmental  shocks,  such  as  natural  disaster,  and  economic 
shocks, such as oil shocks, or spikes in commodity prices.  31 
 
 
  Increasing the job content and poverty alleviation of growth, i.e. moving toward “inclusive 
growth.”  
These co-benefits and the environmental benefits can be captured in many ways. In a Green Growth 
framework, getting the price right is important, and should be the first step, but is likely to be 
insufficient or inapplicable. Indeed, it is often politically difficult to change prices to more appropriate 
values, and many market failures explain why prices cannot be the silver-bullet of environmental 
policies. Because of these failures, it is necessary to complement price-based policies with other policies. 
Additional policy instruments such as norms and regulation, public production and direct investment, 
information creation and dissemination, education and moral suasion, or industrial policies and the 
setting of long-term targets can also be useful. Since green growth policies pursue a variety of goals, 
they are best served by a combination of instruments.  
Specific work is required to analyze the various policies that can meet these goals, and to assess the 
actual extent of synergies that can be achieved. This paper is about a framework to assess green growth 
opportunity. Only policy- and context-specific studies can provide quantified estimates of the synergies 
and trade-offs that are implied by a green growth strategy.  
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